Mostly infinite dimensional economies can be considered limits offinite dimensional economies, in particular when we think of time orproduct differentiation. We investigate conditions under which sequences of quasi-equilibria in finite dimensional economies converge to a quasi-equilibrium in the...

Mostly infinite dimensional economies can be considered limits of finite dimensional economies, in particular when we think of time or product differentiation. We investigate conditions under which sequences of quasi-equilibria in finite dimensional economies converge to a quasi-equilibrium in...

We augment the standard cartel formation game from non-cooperative coalition theory, often applied in the context of international environmental agreements on climate change, with the possibility that singletons support coalition formation without becoming coalition members themselves. Rather,...

Economic theories of managing renewable resources, such as fisheries and forestry, traditionally assume that individual harvesters are perfectly rational and thus able to compute the harvesting strategy that maximizes their discounted profits. The current paper presents an alternative approach...

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the <A href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069612000927">'Journal of Environmental Economics and Management'</A>, 2012, 64(3), 342-363.<P> Optimal climate policy is studied in a Ramsey growth model with exhaustible oil reserves, an infinitelyelastic supply of renewables, stock-dependent oil extraction...</p></a>

This discussion paper led to a publication in 'TOP' (forthcoming).<P> In this paper we introduce and characterize two new values for transferable utility games with graph restricted communication and a priori unions. Both values are obtained by applying the Shapley value to an associated TU-game....</p>

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in 'Games and Economic Behavior', 2010, 68, 626-633. <P> We study cooperative games with communication structure, represented by an undirected graph. Players in the game are able to cooperate only if they can form a network in the graph. A...</p>

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the 'International Journal of Game Theory', 40, 87-110.<P> A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A solution for...</p>