We study an insurance model characterized by a continuum of risk types, private information and a competitive supply … side. We use the model to investigate the welfare effects of discrimination (also known as risk selection). We postulate … find that aggregate surplus decreases when risk aversion is high. When risk aversion is low however, discrimination …

We study an insurance model characterized by a continuum of risk types, private information and a competitive supply … side. We use the model to investigate the welfare effects of discrimination (also known as risk selection). We postulate … find that aggregate surplus decreases when risk aversion is high. When risk aversion is low however, discrimination …

We study an insurance model characterized by a continuum of risk types, private information and a competitive supply … side. We use the model to investigate the welfare effects of discrimination (also known as risk selection). We postulate … find that aggregate surplus decreases when risk aversion is high. When risk aversion is low however, discrimination …

We study an insurance model characterized by a continuum of risk types, private information and a competitive supply … of the information provided by the insuree. Smoking in life insurance is our leading example: there are different rates …

. We examine the effect of this unisex mandate on risk segmentation in the German health insurance market. While gender … used to be a pricing factor in Germany's private health insurance (PHI) sector, it was never used as a pricing factor in … the social health insurance (SHI) sector. The unisex mandate makes PHI relatively more attractive for women and less …

. We examine the effect of this unisex mandate on risk segmentation in the German health insurance market. While gender … used to be a pricing factor in Germany's private health insurance (PHI) sector, it was never used as a pricing factor in … the social health insurance (SHI) sector. The unisex mandate makes PHI relatively more attractive for women and less …

. We examine the effect of this unisex mandate on risk segmentation in the German health insurance market. While gender … used to be a pricing factor in Germany's private health insurance (PHI) sector, it was never used as a pricing factor in … the social health insurance (SHI) sector. The unisex mandate makes PHI relatively more attractive for women and less …

In this paper, equilibrium of the life/medical insurance market is analyzed under conditions where insurers demands …, and on the basis of such equilibrium I discuss the mechanism which causes "genetic discrimination" which is increasingly …

identities are fixed. Discrimination cannot be explained by employers' beliefs and hence seems to be taste-based. When possible … towards ingroup workers and eliminates discrimination. …