We empirically examine the efficacy of various incentives of microlending contracts such as joint-liability or group access to future loans. We find that joint liability induces a group formation of low risk borrowers. Furthermore, the incentive system leads to peer measures between the...

This paper makes an attempt to present the economics of credit securitization in a nontechnical way, starting from the description and the analysis of a typical securitization transaction. The paper sketches a theoretical explanation for why tranching, or nonproportional risk sharing, which is...

This paper contributes to the economics of financial institutions risk management by exploring how loan securitization a.ects their default risk, their systematic risk, and their stock prices. In a typical CDO transaction a bank retains through a first loss piece a very high proportion of the...

This paper analyzes banks' choice between lending to firms individually and sharing lending with other banks, when firms and banks are subject to moral hazard and monitoring is essential. Multiple-bank lending is optimal whenever the benefit of greater diversification in terms of higher...

Small and medium-sized firms often obtain capital via a mixture of relationship and arm's-length bank lending. We show that such heterogeneous multiple bank financing leads to a lower probability of ineefficient credit foreclosure than both monopoly relationship lending and homogeneous multiple...

This paper studies the effects that heterogeneous multiple bank financing has on a firm's risk- and information-policy, particularly with respect to credit renegotiation efficiency. We find that a significant, yet limited, degree of relationship lending enables firms with high asset specificity...

We study the process of growth and business cycles in an open economy which has access to international ¯nancial markets. The ¯nancial market imperfection originates from costly state veri¯cation and a positive probability of default on loans. The degree of credit market imperfection is...

We investigate whether information sharing among banks has affected credit market performance in the transition countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, using a large sample of firm-level data. Our estimates show that information sharing is associatedwith improved availability...

This paper studies how credit constraints develop over bank relationships. I analyze a unique dataset of matched loan application and loan contract information and measure credit constraints as the ratio of requested to granted loan amounts. I find that the most important determinants of...

Empirical evidence suggests that banks often engage in refinancing of intrinsically insolvent debtors instead of writing of their non-performing loans. Such forbearance lending may induce soft budget constraints for the debtors, as it diminishes their incentives to thwart default. This paper...