In a strategic game, a curb set [Basu and Weibull, Econ. Letters 36 (1991) 141] is a product set of pure strategies containing all best responses ro every possible belief restricted to this set. Prep sets [Voorneveld, Games Econ. Behav. 48 (2004) 403] relax this condition by only requiring the...

In a strategic game, a curb set [Basu and Weibull, Econ. Letters 36 (1991) 141] is a product set of pure strategies containing all best responses ro every possible belief restricted to this set. Prep sets [Voorneveld, Games Econ. Behav. 48 (2004) 403] relax this condition by only requiring the...

In a strategic game, a curb set [Basu and Weibull, Econ.Letters 36 (1991) 141-146] is a product set of pure strategies containing all best responses to every possible belief restricted to this set.Prep sets [Voorneveld, Games Econ. Behav. 48 (2004) 403-414] relax this condition by only requiring...

Sets closed under rational behavior were introduced by Basu and Weibull (1991) as subsets of the strategy space that contain all best replies to all strategy profiles in the set. We here consider a more restrictive notion of closure under rational behavior: a subset of the strategy space is...

In this paper we introduce a stochastic network formation model where agents choose both actions and links. Neighbors in the network benefit from each other's action levels through local complementarities and there exists a global interaction effect reflecting a strategic substitutability in...

We develop a simple model to study the coevolution of interaction structures and action choices in Prisoners' Dilemma games. Agents are boundedly rational and choose both actions and interaction partners via payoff-based imitation. The dynamics of imitation and exclusion yields polymorphic...

Counterfactual policy evaluation often requires computation of game-theoretic equilibria. We provide new algorithms for computing pure-strategy Nash equilibria of games on networks with finite action spaces. The algorithms exploit the fact that many agents may be endowed with types such that a...

In this paper we introduce a stochastic network formation model where agents choose both actions and links. Neighbors in the network benefit from each other's action levels through local complementarities and there exists a global interaction effect reflecting a strategic substitutability in...

Counterfactual policy evaluation often requires computation of game‐theoretic equilibria. We provide new algorithms for computing pure‐strategy Nash equilibria of games on networks with finite action spaces. The algorithms exploit the fact that many agents may be endowed with types such that...

In this paper we study the typical dilemma of social coordination between a risk- dominant convention and a payoff-dominant convention. In particular, we consider a model where a population of agents play a coordination game over time, choosing both the action and the network of agents with whom...