This study investigates contracting mechanisms in situations of opportunistic disputes between organizations. The authors specifically explore the relationships between the formal versus informal nature of opportunism and the formal versus informal nature of contractual governance. They use a...

The contracting process is a crucial step in alliance development and its success. However, the existing literature reveals surprisingly little investigation into how organizational learning relates to the process of contract making. We therefore conducted an in-depth longitudinal study of the...

This paper investigates how contract structure influences inter-firm dispute resolution processes and outcomes by examining a unique dataset consisting of over 150,000 pages of documents relating to 102 business disputes. We find that the level of contract detail affects the type of dispute...

This paper theoretically refines and empirically extends the debate on the type of interplay between relational experience and contractual governance in an under-researched area: supply chain disputes. We define relational experience as either cooperative or competitive; distinguish between...

Leveraging a longitudinal dataset concerning 102 inter-firm disputes, we evaluate the effects of contract structure on trust and on the likelihood of continued collaboration. We theoretically refine and empirically extend prior research by (a) distinguishing between control and coordination...

The contracting practices of franchisors outside of theirdomestic markets have received limited attention in the empirical literature on franchising, mostly due to data limitations. We exploit a newly assembled data set that allows us not only to describe the contracting practices of US and...

Prior research suggests that equity joint ventures (JVs) are particularly effective vehicles for accessing complex technology. Different schools of thought have emphasized different reasons why joint ventures might support greater knowledge transfer than "bare" license agreements: incentive...