In this paper we use a reduced form model for the analysis of Portfolio Credit Risk. For this purpose, we fit a Dynamic Factor model, DF, to a large dataset of default rates proxies and macrovariables for Italy. Multi step ahead density and probability forecasts are obtained by employing both...

In this paper, we investigate the ability of a number of different ordered probit models to predict ratings based on firm-specific data on business and financial risks. We investigate models based on momentum, drift and ageing and compare them against alternatives that take into account the...

We address the problem how to estimate default probabilities for sovereign countries based on market data of traded debt. A structural Merton-type model is applied to a sample of emerging market and transition countries. In this context, only few and heterogeneous default probabilities are...

Le crédit interentreprises est un des canaux de transmission du risque de défaillance des entreprises. Les impayés sur effets de commerce révèlent les interdépendances entre secteurs et leur potentiel de contagion, dès lors que les montants en jeu sont importants.

Neural Networks (NN's) involve an innovative method of simulating and analysing complex and constantly changing systems of relationships. Originally developed to mimic the neural architecture and functioning of the human brain, NN techniques have recently been applied to many different business...

Intercompany credit is a transmission channel for business failure risk. Trade bill payment incidents reveal the interdependent links between sectors and their contagion risk potential when large amounts are involved.

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In this paper we use a reduced form model for the analysis of Portfolio Credit Risk. For this purpose, we fit a Dynamic Factor model, DF, to a large dataset of default rates proxies and macro-variables for Italy. Multi step ahead density and probability forecasts are obtained by employing both...

We present a model of bank passivity and regulatory failure. Banks with low equity positions have more incentives to be passive in liquidating bad loans. We show that they tend to hide distress from regulatory authorities and are ready to offer a higher rate of interest in order to attract...