There is ongoing academic interest in understanding share ownership and control dynamics in publicly listed companies, given the corporate governance and regulatory implications arising therefrom. This article presents a new dataset and analysis of shareholder information, focusing on the...

This paper compares the extent of common ownership in the US and the EU stock markets, with a particular focus on differences in the applicable ownership transparency requirements. Most empirical research on common ownership to date has focused on US issuers, largely relying on ownership data...

We construct and analyze a new data set on U.S. corporate ownership to study how the inclusion of blockholders' and corporate insiders' holdings affects the measurement of common ownership among America's largest publicly traded firms. Including blockholders’ and insiders’ holdings reveals...

This paper investigates whether foreign institutional investors in emerging markets can enhance shareholder value. We pay special attention to two dimensions of investor heterogeneity: whether an investor declares itself as an activist, and whether an investor comes from a country with a strong...

We solve a dynamic Kyle model in which the large investor's private information concerns her plans for taking an active role in governance. We show that once a block has been created, its continued existence is jeopardized by an increase in the liquidity of the firm's stock. Greater liquidity...

We test the empirical validity of a claim that has been playing a central role in debates on corporate governance — the claim that interventions by activist hedge funds have a detrimental effect on the long-term interests of companies and their shareholders. We subject this claim to a...

This paper examines mutual fund families' proxy voting records to analyze their choices between voting against management (“voice”) and voting with their feet (“exit”). Even though proxy voting is particularly conducive to governance through voice rather than exit, we provide evidence...

We identify a sample of firms with directors employed by institutional investors and examine the effect of a direct channel of institutional monitoring. Using difference-in-differences tests, we find weak evidence that institutional directors have a positive effect on informational efficiency....

This study examines private pension funds' preferences for shareholder activism in Poland in closely-held firms that dominate stock exchanges in emerging markets. The results show that the major institutional investors engage in a limited spectrum of shareholder activities. Most often they seek...