Proxy advisory firms and large passive mutual funds have faced criticism both for being too powerful and not exercising diligence in proxy voting. We document that the ``Big 3'' passive fund families, Blackrock, State Street, and Vanguard, are increasingly likely to vote with management, and...

This paper studies shareholder activism through environmental, social and governance (ESG) proposals over the period 1996 to 2015. Larger, more mature firms with higher institutional holdings are more easily targeted by these proposals. Target firms spend less on capital expenditure and research...

We use a social network framework to study the alliance building process that involves activists and other institutional investors and the channels that facilitate such interactions. Actively-managed funds whose managers are socially connected to activists are more likely to increase holdings in...

Do informed shareholders who can influence corporate decisions improve governance? We demonstrate this may not be generally true in a model of takeovers. The model suggests that a shareholder's ability to collect information and trade ex post may cause him, ex ante, to support value-destroying...

Firms under the threat of hedge fund activism on average experience significant losses of outstanding bondholder wealth: bond yield and default probability rises while bond prices and ratings deteriorate. Under-threat firms receive inferior terms when initiating new loans. These observations are...

This paper studies the association between hedge fund activism and firm value, using matching procedures to mitigate the selection effects of which firms are chosen as targets by activist hedge funds. We find that targeted firms improve less in value (Q) subsequent to the start of activism than...

We compare activism and takeovers from a blockholder's perspective who can invest effort into improving firm value. Profits from the two intervention modes move in opposite directions when the marginal return to effort changes such that activism, although less efficient, can be more profitable....

This paper investigates the role of institutional trading in the emergence of hedge fund activism – an important corporate governance mechanism. We demonstrate that institutional sales raise a firm's probability of becoming an activist target. Further, by exploiting the funding circumstances...

This paper studies communications between investors and firms as a form of corporate governance. The main premise is that activist investors cannot force their ideas on companies; they must persuade the board or other shareholders that implementing these ideas is beneficial to the firm. I show...

Recently, several academic theories have expressed concern over the growth of index funds. Some have argued that the growth of index funds will afford the asset managers who provide them too much influence over the public companies they invest in, through increased voting power and engagement...