We develop an incentive contracting model of firm formation. Entrepreneurs of private equity firms who differ in net worth are required to borrow from institutional investors in order to finance start up projects. Investors, who differ in monitoring efficiency, may choose to monitor their...

We re-examine the relationship between the degree of deposit market competition and bank risk taking in a model where banks compete in differentiated deposit services. When banks invest their deposits directly, as has already been established in the extant literature, an increased degree of...

When tenancy contracts are subject to ex-post limited liability, it is optimal for the landlord to offer the tenant the entire crop share since full incentive leads to higher production even in the bad state of the nature, which can be appropriated in the form of fixed rental payments. We show,...

I analyze a problem of assigning heterogeneous agents (tenants) to heterogeneous principals (landlords), where partnerships are subject to moral hazard in effort choice. The agents differ in wealth endowment and the principals differ in land quality. When the liability of each agent is limited...

We consider two specific network structures, the star and the line, and study the set of bilateral alternating-offers bargaining procedures for the pairs of connected agents. Agents have complementary information and bargain over the relative price of their pieces of information. We characterize...

I analyse a model of incentive contracts where principals who each possesses the same monitoring technologies, contract with agents from a pool of individuals differing in their wealth endowments. Principals and agents are matched to form partnerships, and the matches are subject to a...

When tenancy contracts are subject to ex-post limited liability, it is optimal for the landlord to offer the tenant the entire crop share since full incentive leads to higher production even in the bad state of the nature, which can be appropriated in the form of fixed rental payments. We show,...

I analyze a problem of assigning heterogeneous agents (tenants) to heterogeneous principals (landlords), where partnerships are subject to moral hazard in effort choice. The agents differ in wealth endowment and the principals differ in land quality. When the liability of each agent is limited...

We analyse a (differentiated good) industry where an incumbent firm owns a network good (essential input) and faces potential competition in the (downstream) retail market. Unlike the traditional approach, we consider a scenario where the decision to compete or not in the downstream segment is...

We consider two specific network structures, the star and the line, and study the set of bilateral alternating-offers bargaining procedures for the pairs of connected agents. Agents have complementary information and bargain over the relative price of their pieces of information. We characterize...