This paper investigates the effectiveness of supervisory discipline on bank risk over the years immediately before, during and just after the recent crisis. It is the first study to consider the effects of informal supervisory enforcement actions in addition to formal actions. Informal...

This paper examines the evolution of the Pillar 2 framework for banks, introduced by the Basel 2 Accord, and discusses the main issues at stake in the current policy debate. The main objective of Pillar 2 was to complement the minimum requirements established by regulators (Pillar 1) with...

I test the market discipline of bank risk hypothesis by examining whether banks choose risk management policies that account for the risk preferences of subordinated debt holders. Using around 500,000 quarterly observations on the population of U.S. insured commercial banks over the 1995-2009...

This paper presents a continuous-time bank capital structure model in which the bank's assets are subject to both diffusion and tail risk. The latter causes uninsured deposits to be risky, as the bank's assets can jump below the threshold at which it is optimal for depositors to run. The model...

We examine the effectiveness of bank regulation in the light of creditor diversity. Our theory suggests a bank can increase its value by matching the riskiness of its securities and the risk tolerance of its diverse creditors. Even a well-capitalized bank might not eliminate financial fragility...

This study investigates spillover effects of banks' liquidity risk control on the real economy by using the introduction of the Basel III liquidity regulation as shocks to banks. Since the Basel Committee's endorsement of this regulation in 2010, banks exposed to high liquidity risk have...

This year, 2015, marks the six-year anniversary of US regulatory stress testing. We observe three key trends: 1) Increasingly aggressive capital management: Banks initially responded to CCAR by maintaining wide capital cushions vs. regulatory minimums. However, as CCAR processes stabilize and...

This article evaluates whether US large bank operational risk capital requirements are forward-looking, sensitive to banks' current exposures, and allow for risk mitigation, and discusses modifications that could bring regulation closer to these goals while also highlighting the potential...

We develop a theory of bank board risk committees. With this theory, such committees are valuable even though there is no expectation that bank risk is lower if the bank has a well-functioning risk committee. As predicted by our theory (1) many large and complex banks voluntarily chose to have a...

This study explores whether and how bank characteristics affect general risk-taking and tail risk of Too-Big-to-Fail (TBTF) and non-TBTF banks differently. We show that TBTF banks’ investment decisions drive their risks, while sources of funding drive risks of other banks. Contradicting the...