We show that the standard analysis of vertical relationships transposes directly to investment timing. Thus, when a firm undertaking a project requires an outside supplier (e.g. an equipment manufacturer) to provide it with a discrete input, and if the supplier has market power, investment...

The objective of the paper is to draw the theory of endogeneity in dynamic models in discrete and continuous time, in particular for diffusions and counting processes. We first provide an extension of the separable set-up to a separable dynamic framework given in term of semi-martingale...

We consider electricity generation industries where thermal operators imperfectly compete with hydro operators that manage a (scarce) water stock stored in reservoirs over a natural cycle. We explore how the exercise of intertemporal market power affects social welfare and environmental quality....

We propose a Quasi-Bayesian nonparametric approach to estimating the structural relationship ' among endogenous variables when instruments are available. We show that the posterior distribution of ' is inconsistent in the frequentist sense. We interpret this fact as the ill-posedness of the...

We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked preferences we find that the rational choice theory provides very good predictions of actual individual behavior in one-round and approval voting elections, but fares poorly in explaining vote choice...

This paper constructs an economic analysis of some organ donation organizations. The two main examples are voluntary marrow donor registries and cord blood banks. The main characteristic of this system is to facilitate the graft of bone marrow or cord blood to patients. These grafts require a...

We show that the celebrated Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) result on the uniformity of the commodity tax rates when preferences are weakly separable between goods and leisure does not hold when (at least) one of the goods is produced within the household. The result is restored if preferences are...

We study the political determination of the level of social long-term care insurance when voters also choose private insurance and saving amounts. Agents di§er in income, probability of becoming dependent and of receiving family help. Social insurance redistributes across income and risk...

We study exchanges between three overlapping generations with non-dynastic altruism. The middleaged choose informal care provided to their parents and education expenditures for their children. The young enjoy their education, while the old may leave a bequest to their children. Within each...

Individuals, differing in productivity and life expectancy, vote over the size and type of a collective annuity. Its type is represented by the fraction of the contributive (Bismarckian) component (based on the workers past earnings) as opposed to the non- contributive (Beveridgean) part (based...