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), and firms have the option of auditing to learn workers’ productivities. Audits are costly and non–contractible. We … characterize the trade–offs between signaling by workers and costly auditing by firms. Auditing is always associated with (partial … feature new auditing patterns and explain empirical observations in labor economics like wage differentials and comparative …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012648090
' productivities from their education choices. In reality, firms also use sophisticated pre-employment auditing to learn workers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011878774
' productivities from their education choices. In reality, firms also use sophisticated pre-employment auditing to learn workers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011888619
In a costly state verification model under commitment the principal may acquire a costly public and imperfectly revealing signal before or after contracting. If the project remains profitable after all signal realisations, optimally the signal is collected, if at all, after contracting, and it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005750365
When early startups stage the financing of their capital investments, they are at risk of being severely diluted by venture capitalists later on. It is puzzling that early startups do so in a competitive financial market. This paper shows that staging is beneficial to an early startup with a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014244912
I show that deterministic dynamic contracts between a principal and an agent are always at least as profitable to the principal as stochastic ones, if the so-called first-order approach in dynamic mechanism design is satisfied. The principal commits, while the agent\'s type evolution follows a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932958
We study a principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection. Risk-neutral agents with limited liability have arbitrary private information about the distribution of outputs and the cost of effort. We show that under a multiplicative separability condition, the optimal mechanism...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536927
We explore the conditions under which the "first-order approach" (FO-approach) can be used to characterize profit maximizing contracts in dynamic principal-agent models. The FO-approach works when the resulting FO-optimal contract satisfies a particularly strong form of monotonicity in types, a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215290
We introduce a dynamic principal-agent model to understand the nature of contracts between an employer and an independent gig worker. We model the worker's self-respect with an endogenous participation constraint; he accepts a job offer if and only if its utility is at least as large as his...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012604955
We use experiments to test comparative statics predictions of canonical tournament theory. Both the roles of principal and agent are populated by human subjects, allowing us to test predictions for both incentive responses and optimal tournament design. Consistent with theory, we observed an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282234