Switzerland is a prime location for both domestically owned as well as foreign-owned multinational enterprises (MNEs). In this paper, we review the literature on MNE activity with respect to its main fundamental (non-policy) drivers, the non-fiscal consequences of MNEs for various economic...

The paper empirically analyzes whether electoral rules make legislators differently responsive to changes in fiscal incentives. Key to the analysis are two unique reforms in the German state of Lower Saxony which changed (i) the municipal charter by replacing the council-manager system...

Conventional wisdom has it that proportional representation leads to more coalition governments and so to greater government spending, especially in redistributive categories favoured by special-interest groups. In contrast, we show in a theoretical model that first-past-the-post systems of...

This paper presents empirical evidence of a positive effect of council size on government spending using a data set of 2,056 municipalities in the German state of Bavaria over a period of 21 years. We apply a regression discontinuity design to avoid an endogeneity bias. In particular, we exploit...

Switzerland is a prime location for both domestically owned as well as foreign-owned multinational enterprises (MNEs). In this paper, we review the literature on MNE activity with respect to its main fundamental (non-policy) drivers, the non-fiscal consequences of MNEs for various economic...

The paper empirically analyzes whether electoral rules make legislators differently responsive to changes in fiscal incentives. Key to the analysis are two unique reforms in the German state of Lower Saxony which changed (i) the municipal charter by replacing the council-manager system...

Conventional wisdom has it that proportional representation leads to more coalition governments and so to greater government spending, especially in redistributive categories favoured by special-interest groups. In contrast, we show in a theoretical model that first-past-the-post systems of...