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In the theory of judgment aggregation on logically connected propositions, an important question remains open: Which aggregation rules are manipulable and which are strategy-proof? We define manipulability and strategy-proofness in judgment aggregation, characterize all strategy-proof...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745758
In response to recent work on the aggregation of individual judgments on logically connected propositions into collective judgments, it is often asked whether judgment aggregation is a special case of Arrowian preference aggregation. We argue the op- posite. After proving a general impossibility...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745935
The paper attached is the revised 23 April 2010 version.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746030
In judgment aggregation, unlike preference aggregation, not much is known about domain restrictions that guarantee consistent majority outcomes. We introduce several conditions on individual judgments sufficient for consistent majority judgments. Some are based on global orders of propositions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746419
How can different individuals’ probability assignments to some events be aggregated into a collective probability assignment? Although there are several classic results on this problem, they all assume that the ‘agenda’of relevant events forms a -algebra, an overly demanding assumption for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746642
Which rules for aggregating judgments on logically connected propositions are manipulable and which not? In this paper, we introduce a preference-free concept of non-manipulability and contrast it with a preference-theoretic concept of strategy-proofness. We characterize all non-manipulable and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071102
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005828006
Behaviourism is the view that preferences, beliefs, and other mental states in social-scienti�c theories are auxiliary constructs re-describing people's behav- ioural dispositions. Mentalism is the view that they capture real phenomena, no less existent than the unobservable entities and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011258839
We introduce a “reason-based” way of rationalizing an agent’s choice behaviour, which explains choices by specifying which properties of the options or choice context the agent cares about (the “motivationally salient properties”) and how he or she cares about these properties (the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260696
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008631247