interpreted as a mechanism theoretical implementation of the Nash solution. Our results in the present paper provide exact non … of the above mentioned support results, including our present ones, with mechanism theoretic implementation in (weakly … implementation can hardly be found except in very rare cases of extremely restricted domains of players' preferences. …

interpreted as a mechanism theoretical implementation of the Nash solution. Our results in the present paper provide exact non … of the above mentioned support results, including our present ones, with mechanism theoretic implementation in (weakly … implementation can hardly be found except in very rare cases of extremely restricted domains of players' preferences. …

) implementation with partially honest agents when there are three or more participants. First, it establishes a condition which is … necessary and sufficient for implementation. Second, it provides simple tests for checking whether or not a social choice … correspondence can be implemented. Their usefulness is shown by examining implementation in a wide variety of environments. …

dimension to the original space of outcomes and construct a static mechanism similar to the one used in virtual implementation …. The implementation is imminent: the mechanism results in the original outcome, which is provided with an arbitrarily small …

implementation with incomplete information has often left out the consideration of mixed-strategy equilibria. This is particularly … necessary and sufficient conditions for full implementation of social choice sets in mixed-strategy Bayesian equilibrium. We … refer to this as mixed implementation. Our results characterize both exact and virtual mixed implementation. For exact …

dimension to the original space of outcomes and construct a static mechanism similar to the one used in virtual implementation …. The implementation is imminent: the mechanism results in the original outcome, which is provided with an arbitrarily small …

We extend implementation theory by allowing the social choice function to depend on more than just the preferences of … is necessary for the implementation of a social choice function f when the preferences of the agents are state … independent and sufficient for implementation for any preferences (including state dependent) with at least three agents if the …

settled, then it is size that matters, with large issues settled first. All parties prefer the former rules of implementation …