Three two-player games are associated with competitive markets having a unique market equilibrium, strictly decreasing market demand functions and increasing linear market supply functions. In these games, a player represents buyers and the other player represents sellers. The players' aim is to...

Lobbyists choose what to lobby for. If they can precommit to certain policy proposals, their choice will have an influence on the behavior of opposing lobbyists. Hence lobbyists have an incentive to moderate their policy proposals in order to reduce the intensity of the lobbying contest. This...

In a tournament, agents form coalitions, and the coalition with largest power wins the tournament. We introduce a new solution concept for the tournaments, called no threat equilibrium (NTE). NTE is a partition of the agents, where prudent and farsighted agents have no incentive to deviate....

In this paper, we provide a unified framework for analyzing competitive markets with adverse selection. The key feature of our model is that whether the suppliers of the contracts (uninformed) are committed to the contracts they offer or not is determined endogenously. Because of the endogeneity...

This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests with two-sided incomplete information. Private information may concern marginal cost, valuations, and ability. Our main result says that, if the contest is uniformly...