This paper traces the origins and the growth implications of one of the most fundamental institutional changes in history. What constituted this change was the emergence of the economic and political corporations in late medieval Europe. quot;Corporationsquot; are defined here, consistent with...

Why do some countries industrialize much earlier than others? One widely-accepted answer is that markets need to be large enough for producers to find it profitable to bear the fixed cost of introducing modern technologies. This insight, however, has limited explanatory power, as illustrated by...

Over the last millennium, the clan and the corporation have been the loci of cooperation in China and Europe respectively. This paper examines -- analytically and historically -- the cultural and institutional co-evolution that led to this bifurcation. We highlight that groups with which...

Over the last millennium, the clan and the corporation have been the loci of cooperation in China and Europe respectively. This paper examines - analytically and historically - the cultural and institutional co-evolution that led to this bifurcation. We highlight that groups with which...

In economies with a large informal sector firms can increase profits by reducing workers' outside options in that informal sector. We formalize this idea in a simple model of an agricultural economy with plantation owners who lobby the government to enact coercive policies—e.g. the eviction...

Edwards and Ogilvie (2008) dispute the empirical basis for the view (Greif, e.g., 1989, 1994, 2006) that multilateral reputation mechanism mitigated agency problems among the eleventh century Maghribi traders. They assert that the relations among merchants and agents were law-based. This paper...

A market-size-only theory of industrialization cannot explain why England developed nearly two centuries before China. One shortcoming of such a theory is its exclusive focus on producers. We show that once we incorporate the incentives of factor suppliers' organizations such as craft guilds,...

In economies with a large informal sector firms can increase profits by reducing workers' outside options in that informal sector. We formalize this idea in a simple model of an agricultural economy with plantation owners who lobby the government to enact coercive policies--e.g. the eviction and...

Students of comparative politics have long faced a vexing dilemma: how can social scientists draw broad, applicable principles of political order from specific historical examples? In Analytic Narratives, five senior scholars offer a new and ambitious methodological response to this important...