breakthrough efforts and show that, in addition to free-riding, procrastination arises. Furthermore, in this model, procrastination …

procrastination. -- Moral Hazard ; team production ; partnerships ; procrastination ; contract design ; discrimination …We study a dynamic model of team production with moral hazard. We show that the players begin to invest effort only … shortly before the time limit when the reward for solving the task is shared equally. We explore how the team can design …

We re-examine the role of managers in preventing free riding when team inputs are not observable. Holmström (1982 …) shows that managers are necessary due to the team's lack of static incentives to implement budget-breaking group punishments …. We ask whether the team can break its own budget in a repeated game. We develop simple strategies that sustain self …

We study a dynamic model of team production with moral hazard. We show that the players begin to invest effort only … shortly before the time limit when the reward for solving the task is shared equally. We explore how the team can design … contracts to mitigate this form of procrastination and show that the second-best optimal contract is discriminatory. We …

We consider dynamic team production in the presence of uncertainty. Team members receive interim feedback that depends …