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We analyse credit market equilibrium when banks screen loan applicants. When banks have a convex cost function of screening, a pure strategy equilibrium exists where banks optimally set interest rates at the same level as their competitors. This result complements Broecker's (1990) analysis,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014061295
We analyse credit market equilibrium when banks screen loan applicants. When banks have a convex cost function of screening, a pure strategy equilibrium exists where banks optimally set interest rates at the same level as their competitors. This result complements Broecker's (1990) analysis,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012736985
We study a retail benchmarking approach to determine access prices for interconnected networks. Instead of considering fixed access charges as in the existing literature, we study access pricing rules that determine the access price that network i pays to network j as a linear function of the...
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Strausz (2017) claims that crowdfunding implements the optimal mechanism design outcome in an environment with entrepreneurial moral hazard and private cost information. Unfortunately, his analysis, solution and claim depend critically on imposing an untenable condition (29) that he had...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012931333
Two-stage game models of information acquisition in stochastic oligopolies require the unrealistic assumption that firms observe the precision of information chosen by their competitors before determining quantities. This paper analyzes secret information acquisition as a one-stage game....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014224473
This paper investigates the optimal design of crowdfunding where crowdfunders are potential consumers with standard motivations and entrepreneurs are profit maximizing agents. We characterize the typical crowdfunding mechanism where the entrepreneur commits to produce only if aggregate funding...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013005816
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