We model platform markets with the matching-with-contracts framework. The solution concept in matching with contracts …

buyer and a single seller is embedded into a matching market with a continuum of traders. I consider steady-state equilibria …

We construct a model of trade with matching frictions. The model provides a simple characterization for the joint …

A market for matching participants with each other, such as buyers and sellers of labor, faces two challenges … deferred-acceptance style proposals, the descending-price design is compatible with optimal search theory, allowing it to …

concerns. Instead of exogenously restricting transfers on a matching market, we introduce a desideratum based on fairness …

We develop theoretical underpinnings of pairwise random matching processes. We formalize the mechanics of matching, and … providing a mapping between matching technologies and informational constraints …

a matching (cooperative game) model. Because a price grid damages the equilibrium of the competitive model, the matching …

When several two-sided matching markets merge into one, it is inevitable that some agents will become worse off if the … matching mechanism used is stable. I formalize this observation by defining the property of integration monotonicity, which … requires that every agent becomes better off after any number of matching markets merge. Integration monotonicity is also …