Cooperation in social dilemmas plays a pivotal role in the formation of systems at all levels of complexity, from replicating molecules to multi-cellular organisms to human and animal societies. In spite of its ubiquity, the origin and stability of cooperation pose an evolutionary conundrum,...

We study how players in a local interaction hawk dove game will learn, if they can either imitate the most succesful player in the neighborhood or play a best reply versus the opponent's previous action. From simulations it appears that each learning strategy will be used, because each performs...

We study evolutionary dynamics in a population of individuals engaged in pairwise social interactions, encoded as iterated games. We consider evolution within the space of memory-1strategies, and we characterize all evolutionary robust outcomes, as well as their tendency to evolve under the...

We study fairness and reciprocity in a Hawk-Dove game. This alllows us to testvarious models in one framework. We observe a large extent of selfish and rationalbehavior. Our results are inconsistent with leading models in this field.

Adaptive dynamics is a mathematical framework for studying evolution. It extends evolutionary game theory to account for more realistic ecological dynamics and it can incorporate both frequency- and density-dependent selection. This is a practical guide to adaptive dynamics that aims to...

Standard one- and two-population models for evolutionary games are the limit cases of a uniparametric family combining intra- and intergroup interactions. Our setup interpolates between both extremes with a coupling parameter k. For the example of the hawk-dove game, we analyze the replicator...