We study information acquisition in a flexible framework with strategic complementarity or substitutability in actions and a rich set of externalities that are responsible for possible wedges between the equilibrium and the efficient acquisition of information. First, we relate the...

We investigate a dynamic advertising model where product quality is endogenous. In the differential game between single-product firms, there exists a parameter range where the low-quality firm uses a more efficient advertising technology and earns higher profits than the rival. Moreover, we show...

In this paper we propose a simple, intuitive approach to asset valuation in terms of marginal contributions to the characteristics (moments) of the market portfolio. Considering only the first two moments, mean and variance, the valuation equation is shown to correspond to Sharpe's CAPM. A...

We investigate a dynamic Cournot duopoly with intraindustry trade, where firms invest in R&D to reduce the level of iceberg transportation costs. We adopt both open-loop and closed-loop equilibrium concepts, showing that a unique (saddle point) steady state exists in both cases. In the open-loop...

We take a differential game approach to study the dynamic market interaction between two Internet Service Providers (ISP) offering services characterized by different quality levels. Web congestion is accounted for, consisting in the fact that for a given network capacity, i.e. for given amount...

We investigate a differential duopoly game where each firm, through capital accumulation over time, may invest both in persuasive advertising campaigns aimed at increasing the willingness to pay of consumers and in an R&D process aimed at increasing the level of own product quality. In contrast...

We study the strategic interaction between two firms competing in quantites which decide whether exporting into each other market. The product is homogeneous and production entails constant returns to scale. Scope effects are present. By dealing with two types of trade costs, namely per unit and...

When the debt of firms in distress is dispersed, a restructuring agreement is difficult to reach because of free riding. We develop a repeated game in which banks come across each other frequently, allowing them to threaten a punishment in case of free riding. As the number of lending banks...

How should firms be incentivized to adopt new technologies when the technical merits and spillovers of such technologies are uncertain? We show that, when information is dispersed but exogenous, efficiency can be induced with simple (constant) subsidies. When, instead, firms must also be...

The main goal of this thesis is to investigate the reasons why firms do often adopt inefficient technologies even when superior ones are widely available, and to assess their consequences. From a macroeconomic perspective it has been emphasized that differences in the adoption and diffusion...