We consider merger remedies of the U.S. Department of Justice's Antitrust Division and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission between 2008 and 2017. Traditionally one distinguishes between structural and behavioral remedies—and structural remedies are generally considered to be more effective and...

In markets for experience or credence goods adverse selection can drive out higher quality products and services. This negative implication of asymmetric information about product quality for trading and welfare, poses the question of how such markets originate. We consider a market in which...

Supply relationships and e-auctions are complementary procurement forms that specialty coffee roasters can utilize when designing a procurement strategy. We model the roasters’ optimal choices of procurement strategies using an extended newsvendor model. By comparing the optimal strategies in...

In a recurring auction early bids may reveal bidders' types, which in turn affects bidding in later auctions. Bidders take this into account and may bid in a way that conceals their private information until the last auction is played. The present paper analyzes the equilibrium of a sequence of...

We consider sequential construction contracts in which bidders may benefit from one auction to the next due to synergistic tasks across the projects auctioned. Theoretical considerations indicate that winners in the former auctions are more likely to participate in latter auctions. Moreover,...

Institutions have gathered considerable interest as to their effects on international trade and growth. We model how weak institutions can reduce the returns to high quality products, thereby creating inefficiency, and we explore whether the ability to export to markets with strong institutions...

Supply relationships and e-auctions are complementary procurement forms that specialty coffee roasters can utilize when designing a procurement strategy. We model the roasters' optimal choices of procurement strategies using an extended newsvendor model. By comparing the optimal strategies in a...

In many procurement auctions bidders do not know how many rivals they face at the time that they incur the cost of preparing their bids.We show in a theoretical model that regardless of whether the procurement is characterized by private or by common values an increase in the potential number of...

In a recurring auction early bids may reveal bidders' types, which in turn affects bidding in later auctions. Bidders take this into account and may bid in a way that conceals their private information until the last auction is played. The present paper analyzes the equilibrium of a sequence of...