This paper examines the institutional determinants of discipline in legislative parties building on the premise that leaders need to maintain support within the organization to continue leading. Payments distributed by the incumbent on the spot increase the value of promises of future benefits...

The citizen-candidate approach, proposed to study the performance of representative democracies, builds on a multi-stage game where the same agents are asked whether or not to become a candidate and, successively, to vote. Consistently, the solution concept adopted in Besley and Coate (1997)...

We study a game theoretic model of a parliamentary democracy under proportional representation where ideologically motivated citizen groups form parties, voting occurs and governments are formed. We study the coalition governments that emerge as functions of the parties' seat shares, the size of...

The essay explains how ranked-choice voting leads to election outcomes that better represent what voters want compared with first-past-the-post, the traditional American voting system. It also shows that there is an even better system: majority-rule

The expression "cash-for-votes" describes a form of vote buying in which candidates for office pay individuals in exchange for their votes. That practice undermines the functioning of democracy but is pervasive in many parts of the world, especially in the Global South. We discuss estimates of...

I study a one-dimensional Hotelling-Downs model of electoral competition in which unelectable fringe candidates with extreme policy platforms are an integral part of the political process. When the preferences of voters change over time, and there are restrictions on political parties changing...