We study how to partition a set of agents in a stable way when each coalition in the partition has to share a unit of a perfectly divisible good, and each agent has symmetric single-peaked preferences on the unit interval of his potential shares. A rule on the set of preference profiles consists...

The division problem under constraints consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a subset of agents with single-peaked preferences on an exogenously given interval of feasible allotments. We characterize axiomatically the family of extended...

We associate to each cost spanning tree problem a non-cooperative game, which is inspired by a real-life problem. We study the Nash equilibria and subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game. We prove that these equilibria are closely related with situations where agents connect sequentially to...

We introduce a compromise value for non-transferable utility games: the Chi-compromise value. It is closely related to the Compromise value introduced by Borm, Keiding, McLean, Oortwijn, and Tijs (1992), to the MC-value introduced by Otten, Borm, Peleg, and Tijs (1998), and to the Ω-value...

We study coalitional values for games in generalized characteristic function form. There are two extensions of the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) in this context, one introduced by Nowak and Radzik (1994) and the other introduced by us. We generalize both values to games with a priori unions in...

Multi-issue allocation situations are used to study the problem of having to divide an estate among a group of agents. The claim of each agent is a vector specifying the amount claimed by each agent on each issue. We present several axiomatic characterizations of the constrained equal awards...

Agents are connected each other through a tree. Each link of the tree has an associated cost and the total cost of the tree must be divided among the agents. In this paper we assume that agents are asymmetric (think on countries that use aqueducts to bring water from the rainy regions to the dry...

We explore in this paper the axiomatic approach to the problem of sharing the revenue from museum passes. We formalize two models for this problem on the grounds of two different informational bases. In both models, we provide axiomatic rationale for natural rules to solve the problem. We,...