The paper analyzes the welfare properties of voluntary agreements (VA) with polluters, when they are obtained under the legislative threat of an alternative stricter policy option. In the model, the threat is an abatement quota. Both the threat and its probability of implementation are...

The paper analyzes the welfare properties of voluntary agreements (VA) with polluters, when they are obtained under the legislative threat of an alternative stricter policy option. In the model, the threat is an abatement quota. Both the threat and its probability of implementation are...

The paper analyzes the welfare properties of voluntary agreements (VA) with polluters, when they are obtained under the legislative threat of an alternative stricter policy option. In the model, the threat is an abatement quota. Both the threat and its probability of implementation are...

In reality, most voluntary agreements (VAs) with polluters are not enforceable in the sense that no legal tools are available to enforce firms' commitments. We examine whether such VAs are able to achieve an efficient level of environmental protection when they are obtained under the legislative...

The purpose of this comment is to correct some mathematical and implicational errors in Roelfsema [in J.Environ.Econom.Management 53, 270-275 (2007)] who points out a new theoretical possibility explaining the discrepancy between theory and evidence about 'the race to the bottom' in...

We develop and test a theory of the rule of law and environmental policy formation. In our model an increase in the degree of rule of law has two opposing partial effects on environmental policy: first, a greater share of policy decisions are implemented according to law; second, industry...

This paper seeks to contribute to the unresolved issue of the effect of economic integration on environmental policy. In particular, we discuss the joint impact of trade openness and political uncertainty. Our theory predicts that the effect of trade integreation on the environment is...

We employ a common agency model to examine how green lobbies affect the determination of trade and environmental policy in two large countries that are linked through trade flows and transboundary pollution. We show that, when governments are not restricted in their ability to use trade...

In actual environmental policy, the design of actual pollution emission taxes differs significantly with the optimal Pigovian tax. In particular, earmarking prevails and actual taxes are usually combined with regulation. Furthermore tax rates are generally too low to significantly influence...