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We present a model of policy development in which competing factions have different ideologies, yet agree on certain common objectives. Policy developers can appeal to a decision maker by making productive investments to improve the quality of their proposals. These investments are specific to a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011211791
In Gilligan and Krehbiel's models of procedural choice in legislatures, a committee exerts costly effort to acquire private information about an unknown state of the world. Subsequent work on expertise, delegation, and lobbying has largely followed this approach. In contrast, we develop a model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008866036
In political organizations, the process of developing new policies often involves competing policy entrepreneurs who make productive investments to make their proposals more appealing to decisionmakers. We analyze how entrepreneurs' extremism and costs of crafting high-quality proposals affect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011183947
We analyze a model of policymaking in which only one actor, e.g., a bureaucratic agency or a well-funded interest group, has the capacity to develop high-quality policy proposals. By virtue of her skills, this actor has an effective monopoly on policy development and thus can craft proposals...
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This paper presents a theory of common agency lobbying in which policy-interested lobbies can first influence the choice of a proto-coalition and then influence the legislative bargaining over policy within that coalition. The equilibrium policy in the legislative bargaining stage maximizes the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013087264