The Median Voter Theorem is an extremely popular result in Political Economy that holds only if the policy space is unidimensional. This assumption restricts its use to a class of very simple problems. In most applications in the literature this implied an oversimplification of the problem...

We suggest a new game-theory-based ranking method for wines, in which the Shapley Value of each wine is computed, and wines are ranked according to their Shapley Values. Judges should find it simpler to use, since they are not required to rank order or grade all the wines, but merely to choose...

This paper introduces information aggregation into the standard spatial committee game. We assume that committee members must agree on a decision rule to aggregate their private information on a policy-relevant state of the world. We derive sufficient conditions for the ex ante incentive...

In this paper we are interested in efficient and individually rational exchange rules for markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods that exclude the possibility that an agent benefits by regrouping goods in her initial endowment. We present a suitable environment in which the existence of...

In this paper we are interested in efficient and individually rational exchange rules for markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods that exclude the possibility that an agent benefits by regrouping goods in her initial endowment. We present a suitable environment in which the existence of...

This paper introduces information aggregation into the standard spatial committee game. We assume that committee members must agree on a decision rule to aggregate their private information on a policy-relevant state of the world. We derive sucient conditions for the ex ante incentive compatible...

In this paper we are interested in efficient and individually rational exchange rules for markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods that exclude the possibility that an agent benefits by regrouping goods in her initial endowment. We present a suitable environment in which the existence of...

We show that the characterization result of the weak core correspondence in simple games in Takamiya et al. (2018) still holds true even when the set of alternatives contains uncountably infinite elements

Some of the basic results and insights of the literature on mechanism design are presented. In that literature game theoretic reasoning is used to model social institutions as varied as voting systems, auctions, bargaining protocols, and methods for deciding on public projects. A theme that...

We extends the single-crossing property of preferences to tree graphs, and show that it is equivalent to intermediate preferences and order restriction, also extended to tree graphs. Moreover, to facilitate the use of single-crossing in network games, we develop algorithms to answer the...