I consider the problem of assigning agents to objects where each agent must pay the price of the object he gets and prices must sum to a given number. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the true preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism...

We study assignment problems with externalities where agents have expectations about the reactions of other agents to group deviations. We present notions of core consistent with such expectations and identify the largest and smallest cores. We restrict the domain of preferences to study the...

In discrete exchange economies with possibly redundant and joint ownership, we propose new core notions in the conventional flavor by regarding endowments as rights to consume or trade with others. Our key idea is to identify self-enforcing coalitions and to redistribute their redundant property...

Organizations (especially firms) often rotate employees' jobs from period to period. We propose a market design approach to organize job rotation in any given period. In our model each employee has occupied a position. Rotation requires that the occupier of a position must leave if any other...

Yu and Zhang (2020) propose a job rotation model to study rotation schemes thatwidely exist in real life. In the model agents' rights to consume own endowmentsare restricted, but their rights to trade endowments are unrestricted. This poses aninteresting contrast with the housing market model of...