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Kesten, Onur; Kurino, Morimitsu; Nesterov, Alexander - 2015

There has been a surge of interest in stochastic assignment mechanisms which proved to be theoretically compelling thanks to their prominent welfare properties. Contrary to stochastic mechanisms, however, lottery mechanisms are commonly used for indivisible good allocation in real-life. To help...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010478795

House Allocation with Overlapping Agents: A DynamicMechanism Design Approach

Kurino, Morimitsu - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2009

Many real-life applications of house allocation problems are dynamic. For example, inthe case of on-campus housing for college students, each year freshmen apply to move inand graduating seniors leave. Each student stays on campus for a few years only. A studentis a \newcomer" in the beginning...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009022173

Preference revelation games and strong cores of allocation problems with indivisibilities

Takamiya, Koji (contributor) - 2006

solution is a strong core selection. Given this fact, this paper examines the equilibrium outcomes of the preference revelation … equilibrium outcomes coincides with the strong core. This generalizes one of the results by Shin and Suh (1996) obtained in the …. -- generalized indivisible good allocation problem ; preference revelation game ; strict strong Nash equilibrium ; strong core …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003321321

House allocation with overlapping agents : a dynamic mechanism design approach

Kurino, Morimitsu - 2009

Many real-life applications of house allocation problems are dynamic. For example, in the case of on-campus housing for college students, each year freshmen apply to move in and graduating seniors leave. Each student stays on campus for a few years only. A student is a "newcomer" in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003883281

House allocation with overlapping generations

Kurino, Morimitsu - 2011 - First Draft: October 2008, This Draft: May 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009152626

Efficient lottery design

Kesten, Onur; Kurino, Morimitsu; Nesterov, Alexander - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010478986

Two-sided matching via balanced exchange : tuition and worker exchanges

Dur, Umut Mert; Ünver, M. Utku - 2015

We introduce a new matching model to mimic two-sided exchange programs such as tuition and worker exchange, in which each firm has to avoid being a net-exporter of workers. These exchanges use decentralized markets, making it difficult to achieve a balance between exports and imports. We show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011297547

Course Bidding at Business Schools

Sonmez, Tayfun - 2008

Mechanisms that rely on course bidding are widely used at Business Schools in order to allocate seats at oversubscribed courses. Bids play two key roles under these mechanisms to infer student preferences and to determine who have bigger claims on course seats. We show that these two roles may...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012725948

Preference Revelation Games and Strong Cores of Allocation Problems with Indivisibilities

Takamiya, Koji - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012733933

Two New Characterizations of Ordinal Efficiency

Dasgupta, Sulagna - 2020

We study the object allocation problem and present two new characterizations of ordinal efficiency in terms of supports of random assignments. Our main characterization provides a link between ex-post and ordinal efficiency

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012823294