of players. The social structure is utilized to refine the core of the game. For every coalition the relative strength of … stable core is the set of socially stable elements of the core. We show that the socially stable core is non-empty if the … game itself is socially stable. In general the socially stable core consists of a finite number of faces of the core and …

of players. The social structure is utilized to refine the core of the game. For every coalition the relative strength of … stable core is the set of socially stable elements of the core. We show that the socially stable core is non-empty if the … game itself is socially stable. In general the socially stable core consists of a finite number of faces of the core and …

of players. The social structure is utilized to refine the core of the game. For every coalition the relative strength of … stable core is the set of socially stable elements of the core. We show that the socially stable core is non-empty if the … game itself is socially stable. In general the socially stable core consists of a finite number of faces of the core and …

structure is utilized to refine the core of the game. For every coalition the relative strength of a player within that … the collection of coalitions that can attain it, all players have the same power. The socially stable core is the set of … socially stable elements of the core. We show that the socially stable core is non-empty if the game itself is socially stable …

This chapter reviews the theory of the voluntary public and private redistribution of wealth elaborated by economic … analysis in the last forty years or so. The central object of the theory is altruistic gift-giving, construed as benevolent … voluntary redistribution of income or wealth. The theory concentrates on lump-sum voluntary transfers, individual or collective …