Transnational externalities (e.g. transboundary pollution, trade, contagious diseases and terrorism) warrant coordination and cooperation between governments, but this proves often difficult. One reason for the meager success is the public good character of many of these economic problems,...

Na and Shin (1998) showed that the veil of uncertainty can be conducive to the success of self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Later papers confirmed this negative conclusion about the role of learning. In the light of intensified research efforts worldwide to reduce...

Na and Shin (1998) showed that the veil of uncertainty can be conducive to the success of self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Later papers confirmed this result. In the light of intensified research efforts worldwide to reduce uncertainty about the environmental impact of...

According to international law, straddling fish stocks should be managed cooperatively through Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs). This paper analyzes the stability and success of these organizations through a game in partition function form based on the classical...

Technological developments intensify linkages between nations, making unilateral policies less effective. Though transnational externalities (e.g. trade, contagious diseases and terrorism) warrants coordination and cooperation between governments, this proves some times difficult. This is...

In this paper the management of straddling fish stocks is approached through a coalition game in partition function form. A two-stage game is applied, assuming ex ante symmetric players and the classical Gordon-Schaefer bioeconomic model. It is shown that the game is characterized by positive...