This paper studies the aggregate and distributional implications of Markov-perfect taxspending policy in a neoclassical growth model with capitalists and workers. Focusing on the long run, our main findings are: (i) it is optimal for a benevolent government, which cares equally about its...

The conditional equity premium in the model with production is often approximated by assuming a jointly log-normal distribution of the marginal rate of substitution in consumption and the marginal productivity of capital. We show that, for standard parameterization, this premium is about one...

We examine wage competition in a model where identical workers choose the number of jobs to apply for and identical firms simultaneously post a wage. The Nash equilibrium of this game exhibits the following properties: (i) an equilibrium where workers apply for just one job exhibits unemployment...

We study a two-sided market where a platform attracts firms selling differentiated products and buyers interested in those products. In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game, the platform fully internalizes the network externalities present in the market and firms and consumers all...

Microeconometrics researchers have increasingly realized the essential need to account for any within-group dependence in estimating standard errors of regression parameter estimates. The typical preferred solution is to calculate cluster-robust or sandwich standard errors that permit quite...

Measuring the gain in income from migration is complicated by non-random selection of migrants from the general population, making it hard to obtain an appropriate comparison group of non-migrants. This paper uses a migrant lottery to overcome this problem, providing an experimental measure of...

We consider the problem of mechanism design by a principal who has private information. We point out a simple condition under which the privacy of the principal's information is irrelevant in the sense that the mechanism implemented by the principal coincides with the mechanism that would be...

We develop a two-sector, two-country model where trade is driven by technological differences. Each country is populated by large number of heterogeneous workers distinguished by their level of skills. Given that one country has a technological advantage in the skilled intensive good when we...