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Using the strategy method (Selten 1967) we elicit subjects' strategies for playing any 2-person 3x3-game with integer payoffs between 0 and 99.In each of 5 tournaments, every strategy pair plays 500000 games.The frequency of pure strategy equilibrium play increases from 51% in the first to 74%...
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We test the effect of players' moods on their behavior in a gift-exchange game.In the first stage of the game, player 1 chooses a transfer to player 2.In the second stage, player 2 chooses an effort level.Higher effort is more costly for player 2, but it increases player 1's payoff.We say that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091714
Different axiomatic systems for the Shapley value can be found in the literature.For games with a coalition structure, the Shapley value also has been axiomatized in several ways.In this paper, we discuss a generalization of the Shapley value to the class of partition function form games.The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091748
In this paper we investigate the truth (more often the untruth) of seventeen commonly heard statements about tennis.We base our analysis on point-by-point data of almost 500 singles matches played at Wimbledon, 1992-1995.The seventeen hypotheses under consideration are: 1 A player is as good as...
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The implications of assuming that it is commonly known that players consider only admissible best responses are investigated.Within a states-of-the-world model where a state, for each player, determines a strategy set rather than a strategy the concept of fully permissible sets is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091831
In this paper we construct sets of marginal vectors of a TU game with the property that if the marginal vectors from these sets are core elements, then the game is convex.This approach leads to new upperbounds on the number of marginal vectors needed to characterize convexity.An other result is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091846