We study minority representation in the workplace when employers engage in optimal sequential search and minorities convey noisier signals of ability than mainstream job candidates. The greater signal noise makes it harder for minorities to change employers' prior beliefs. When employers are...

We study the value of commitment in contests and tournaments when there are costs for the follower to observe the leader's behavior. In a contest, the follower can pay to observe the leader's effort but cannot observe the effectiveness of that effort. In a tournament, the follower can pay to...

We study the value of commitment in contests and tournaments when there are costs for the follower to observe the leader's behavior. In a contest, the follower can pay to observe the leader's effort but cannot observe the effectiveness of that effort. In a tournament, the follower can pay to...

We extend Krugman's (1979) model of trade to multiple sectors or industries and show that, sector-by-sector, a bit of trade is worse than no trade at all. The reason is that the gains from the initiation of trade are second-order, while the welfare loss from the associated drop in varieties is...