bear a higher burden of punishment costs than non-police subjects. When the norm enforcement institution is endogenous, all …

bear a higher burden of punishment costs than non-police subjects. When the norm enforcement institution is endogenous, all …

We experimentally investigate whether third-party punishment is more effective than second-party punishment to increase … public goods contribution. In our experiment, third parties first played the standard public goods game and then made … punishment decisions as independent bystanders. We find that third parties punished more frequently, severely, and less …

We analyze the interplay between cooperation norms and people's punishment behavior in a social-dilemma game with … multiple punishment stages. By combining multiple punishment stages with self-contained episodes of interaction, we are able to … disentangle the effects of retaliation and norm-related punishment. An additional treatment provides information on the norms …

Carpenter and Matthews (2009) examine the cooperation norms determining people's punishment behavior in a social … punishment. Using multiple punishment stages and self-contained episodes of interaction, we disentangle the effects of … retaliation and norm-related punishment. An additional treatment provides data on the norms bystanders use in judging punishment …

This paper deals with the effects of introducing adequate punishment opportunities in experiments with public goods …. Decentralized punishment means that the contributing subjects have a possibility to sanction free riders without the intervention of … an external authority. The very first experiments demonstrated a significantly positive effect of a punishment …

bear a higher burden of punishment costs than non-police subjects. When the norm enforcement institution is endogenous, all …

We use a public-good experiment to analyze behavior in a decentralized asymmetric punishment institution. The … institution is asymmetric in the sense that players differ in the effectiveness of their punishment. At the aggregate level, we … observe remarkable similarities between outcomes in asymmetric and symmetric punishment institutions. Controlling for the …

This paper studies how the existence of counter-punishment opportunities affects cooperation and welfare when agents … face a social dilemma. Using a public-good game we find that under the threat of counter-punishment cooperators are less … willing to punish free-riders. As a result, under both fixed and random matching, the fear of counter-punishment to a large …