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An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values

Balkenborg, Dieter; Makrēs, Miltiadēs - In: Journal of economic theory 157 (2015), pp. 918-958

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011525357

Information, incentives and institutions

Liu, Shuo - 2019

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012119217

Limit of the principal's information

Hori, Kazumi - In: Theoretical economics letters 7 (2017) 2, pp. 210-217

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011660290

On the optimal use of correlated information in contractual design under limited liability

Danau, Daniel; Vinella, Annalisa - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011712933

Mechanism design with information acquisition

Bikhchandani, Sushil; Obara, Ichiro - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 63 (2017) 3, pp. 783-812

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011740057

On the optimal use of correlated information in contractual design under limited liability

Danau, Daniel; Vinella, Annalisa - 2018

Riordan and Sappington (JET, 1988) show that in an agency relationship in which the agent's type is correlated with a public ex post signal, the principal may attain first best (full surplus extraction and efficient output levels) if the agent is faced with a lottery such that each type is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011822030