Naturally, competition policy is based on competition economics made applicable in terms of law and its enforcement. Within the different branches of competition economics, modern industrial economics, or more precisely gametheoretic oligopoly theory, has become the dominating paradigm both in...

The relevant competitors in regard to innovation might, but not necessarily do, correspond to the identified competitors on actual product markets. Hence, the conventional analysis of product markets, in order to assess the potential anticompetitive effects of mergers, is insufficient to capture...

Dieses Paper beschäftigt sich mit dem Zusammenhang zwischen der Wettbewerbspolitik in China und dem WTO-Beitritt. Es wurde festgestellt, dass der WTO-Beitritt zur rechtlichen Verankerung der Wettbewerbspolitik in China wesentlich beigetragen hat. Die chinesische Transformation von der...

Dominant or apparently dominant internet platform increasingly become subject to both antitrust investigations and further-reaching political calls for regulation. While Google is currently in the focus of the discussion, the next candidate is already on the horizon - the ubiquitous online...

This chapter discusses the independence of competition authorities and addresses the question whether an independent European competition authority would perform a better competition policy than the competition office of the European Commission, which is not independent but, instead, integral...

This is the first installment of a two-part commentary on the New Brandeis School in Antitrust. In this first part, I examine why the New Brandeis School is correct to reject the consumer welfare standard. Instead of arguing, as the New Brandesians do, that the consumer welfare standard leads to...