Most of the literature on two-sided matching markets without transfers focuses on the case where a central planner (often an algorithm) clears the market, like in the case of school assignments, or medical residents. In contrast, we focus on decentralized matching markets without transfers,...

We investigate in this paper the theory and econometrics of optimal matchings with competing criteria. The surplus from a marriage match, for instance, may depend both on the incomes and on the educations of the partners, as well as on characteristics that the analyst does not observe.The social...

We provide a test for the specification of a structural model without identifying assumptions. We show the equivalence of several natural formulations of correct specification, which we take as our null hypothesis. From a natural empirical version of the latter, we derive a Kolmogorov-Smirnov...

This note introduces a maximum likelihood estimator of the value of job amenities and labor productivity in a single matching market based on the observation of equilibrium matches and wages. The estimation procedure simultaneously fits both the matching patterns and the wage curve. Our...

We present a class of one-to-one matching models with perfectly transferable utility. We discuss identification and inference in these separable models, and we show how their comparative statics are readily analyzed

We analyze the effects of taxation in two-sided matching markets, i.e. markets in which all agents have heterogeneous preferences over potential partners. In matching markets, taxes can generate inefficiency on the allocative margin by changing who is matched to whom, even if the number of...

In this paper, we argue that models coming from a variety of fields share a common structure that we call matching function equilibria. This structure revolves around an aggregate matching function and a system of nonlinear equations. This encompasses search and matching models, matching models...

In this paper, we address the problem of estimating transport surplus (a.k.a. matching affinity) in high dimensional optimal transport problems. Classical optimal transport theory specifies the matching affinity and determines the optimal joint distribution. In contrast, we study the inverse...

Using results from convex analysis, we investigate a novel approach to identification and estimation of discrete choice models which we call the “Mass Transport Approach” (MTA). We show that the conditional choice probabilities and the choice specific payoffs in these models are related in...