In this paper we consider equilibrium behavior in a Dutch (descending price) auction where the bidders are uninformed … auction. We assume that the information acquisition activity is covert. We characterize the equilibrium behavior in a setting …, the Dutch auction produces more revenue than would a first price auction …

This paper characterizes the Nash equilibrium in a pay-as-bid (discriminatory), divisible-good, procurement auction …. Demand by the auctioneer is uncertain as in the supply function equilibrium model. A closed form expression is derived …. Existence of an equilibrium is ensured if the hazard rate of the perfectly inelastic demand is monotonically decreasing and …

In this paper we consider equilibrium behavior in a Dutch (descending price) auction where the bidders are uninformed … auction. We assume that the information acquisition activity is covert. We characterize the equilibrium behavior in a setting …, the Dutch auction produces more revenue than would a first price auction …

We identify a natural counterpart of the standard GARP for demand data in which goods are all indivisible. We show that … the data by a well-behaved utility function. Our results complement the main finding of Polisson and Quah, Am. Econ. J ….: Micro. 5(1) p.28-34 (2013), who rather minimally modify the original consumer problem with indivisible goods so that the …