Men's and women's preferences are intercorrelated to the extent that men rank highly those women who rank them highly. Intercorrelation plays an important but overlooked role in determining outcomes of matching mechanisms. We study via simulation the effect of intercorrelated preferences on...

This paper revisits manipulation via capacities in centralized two-sided matching markets. Sönmez (1997) showed that no stable mechanism is nonmanipulable via capacities. We show that non-manipulability via capacities can be equivalently described by two types of non-manipulation via...

This paper revisits manipulation via capacities in centralized two-sided matching markets. Sönmez (1997) showed that no stable mechanism is nonmanipulable via capacities. We show that non-manipulability via capacities can be equivalently described by two types of non-manipulation via...

We introduce externalities into a two-sided, one-to-one assignment game by letting the values generated by pairs depend on the behavior of the other agents. Extending the notion of blocking to this setup is not straightforward; a pair has to take into account the possible reaction of the residual...

We develop a model of assignment games with pairwise-identity-dependent externalities. A concept of conjectural equilibrium is proposed, and the universal conjecture is shown to be the necessary and sufficient condition for the general existence of equilibrium. We then apply the solution concept...

In this paper, we consider two-sided, many-to-one matching problems where agents in one side of the market (hospitals) impose some distributional constraints (e.g., a minimum quota for each hospital). We show that when the preference of the hospitals is represented as an M-natural-concave...

we propose a fairness property called P-monotonicity that we would like a matching mechanism to satisfy. We show that it is impossible to have a mechanism which is both stable and P- monotonic. Moreover, we show that it is impossible to have a mechanism which is both efficient and P-monotonic.

This paper studies implicit pricing of non-wage job characteristics in the labour market using a two-sided matching model. It departs from the previous literature by allowing worker heterogeneity in productivity, which gives rise to a double transaction problem in a hedonic model. Deriving...

We study procedurally fair matching mechanisms that produce stable matchings for the so-called marriage model of one-to-one, two-sided matching. Our main focus is on two such mechanisms: employment by lotto introduced by Aldershof et al. (1999) and the random order mechanism due to Roth and...

This paper studies implicit pricing of non-wage job characteristics in the labour market using a two-sided matching model. It departs from the previous literature by allowing worker heterogeneity in productivity, which gives rise to a double transaction problem in a hedonic model. Deriving...