At any given point in time, the collection of assets existing in the economy is observable. Each asset is a function of a set of contingencies. The union taken over all assets of these contingencies is what we call the set of publicly known states. An innovation is a set of states that are not...

This paper investigates the impact of determination of an original initiator of transmission on demand as well as profits of the providers. For that purpose we present a new model, called differentiated traffic-based interconnection agreement (DTIA) that differentiates traffic into two types,...

Cost allocation between interconnected networks is based on measured traffic flows. This principle, however, does not provide a fair way for sharing costs. In this paper, a new bilateral model, called Differentiated Traffic-based Interconnection Agreement (DTIA) for intercarrier compensation is...

In terms of intercarrier compensation traffic flows are measured to allocate the costs between networks. This method provides a poor basis for sharing any costs. In this work we analyze the benefits of the traffic differentiation on the interconnection charges in unilateral and bilateral...

This paper addresses the inter-provider costs sharing issue by exploring the effect of the traffic differentiation on the interconnection payments. In particular, we determine an original initiator of a transmission by means of traffic differentiation into two types, referred to as native and...

At any given point in time, the collection of assets existing in the economy is observable. Each asset is a function of a set of contingencies. The union taken over all assets of these contingencies is what we call the set of publicly known states. An innovation is a set of states that are not...

This paper studies how external incentives can help agents to coordinate in summary-statistic games. Agents follow a myopic best-reply rule and face a trade-off between efficiency and strategic uncertainty. A principal can help agents to coordinate on the Pareto optimal equilibrium by monitoring...

I formalise a rather stylised insurance market with adverse selection as a standard duopoly. I formally specify demand functions and profits and I prove that a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies exists if and only if the well-known Rothschild-Stiglitz allocation is efficient

Abstract. A system that allows you to easily regulate the cryptocurrency market and influence it thanks to the classification given by their scalability. The opportunity to be included in a different table will push programmers to adapt to the legislation. It will no longer be the right to have...

This paper studies how external incentives can help agents to coordinate in summary-statistic games. Agents follow a myopic best-reply rule and face a trade-off between efficiency and strategic uncertainty. A principal can help agents to coordinate on the Pareto optimal equilibrium by monitoring...