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Lignite price negotiation between opencast mine and power plant as a two-stage, two-person, cooperative, non-zero sum game

Jurdziak, Leszek - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006

Based on the simple model of the deposit the methodology of finding the optimal solution for bilateral monopoly (BM) of lignite mine and power plant is shown taking into account pit optimisation. It is proposed to treat lignite price negotiation as a kind of game. In the first stage...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835411

Grid Business Models for Brokers Executing SLA-Based Workflows

Quan, Dang Minh; Altmann, Jorn - Technology Management, Economics and Policy Program … - 2010

In the Grid Computing environment, many users need the results of their calculations within a specific period of time. Those users are willing to pay for getting their work completed on time. However, this requirement must be agreed on in a Service Level Agreement (SLA) by both, the user and the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008511399

Schemat arbitrażowy Nasha, a podział zysków w bilateralnym monopolu kopalni węgla brunatnego i elektrowni. Cześć druga – zastosowania w negocjacjach strategicznych i taktycznych

Jurdziak, Leszek - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006

The application of Nash bargaining solution to profit division in negotiation between opencast lignite mine and power plant has been discussed. Different proposals of status quo point usage and ways of its determination for profit sharing both in strategic and tactical/operational negotiation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005260247

A Welfare Analysis of Arbitration

Olszewski, Wojciech - In: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 3 (2011) 1, pp. 174-213

The paper compares conventional and final-offer arbitration. One party is supposed to make a payment to another party, whose amount depends on a state. Under one scenario, parties obtain signals about the state, which cannot be recognized by the opponents. If the arbitrator's ability of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008804888

Sweet Talk: A Theory of Persuasion

Di Maggio, Marco - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009

This paper introduces a model of sweet talk in which a seller may acquire verifiable information and selectively disclose it to a buyer to negotiate a deal. We start by analyzing a model with common priors in which the seller generates information for two reasons: a trading motive and a profit...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008472248

Wealth and the Principal-Agent Matching

Fagandini, Paulo - 2018

I study the role the agent's wealth plays in the principal-agent matching with moral hazard and limited liability. I consider wealth and talent as the agent's type, and size as the firm's (principal's) type. Because utility is not perfectly transferable in this setup, I use generalized...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012912553

A Theory of Debt Maturity and Innovation

Mitkov, Yuliyan - 2021

I propose a theory of debt maturity as an incentive device to motivate innovation when contracts are fundamentally incomplete and shaped by ex-post renegotiation. The financing of innovative firms must balance two goals. On the one hand, since innovation is inherently risky, the entrepreneur...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013240421

Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Asymmetric Information

Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2021

Consider two parties who can make non-contractible investments in the provision of a public good. Who should own the physical assets needed to provide the public good? In the literature it has been argued that the party who values the public good most should be the owner, regardless of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013229169

Informational hold up and intermediaries

Utgoff, Naomi - In: Games 13 (2022) 5, pp. 1-14

Why do some incomplete information markets feature intermediaries while others do not? I study the allocation of two goods in an incomplete information setting with a single principal, multiple agents with unit demand, and interdependent valuations. I construct a novel dynamic mechanism...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418049

(Interim) Bayesian efficiency implies two-agent Bayesian implementation

Korpela, Ville - 2020

We study the relationship between two-agent implementation problems and the notionof interim efficiency due to …, Bayesianefficiency, and show that it is sufficient for implementation of social choice functions.We also show that this condition is … sufficient for implementation of social choice setsunder a weak domain restriction - in particular, no economic condition is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012852742