We present a model of participation in large elections in which the formation of voter groups is endogenous. Partisan citizens decide whether to become leaders (activists) and try to persuade impressionable citizens to vote for the leaders' preferred party. In the (unique) pure strategy...

We consider a canonical two-period model of elections with adverse selection (hidden preferences) and moral hazard (hidden actions), in which neither voters nor politicians can commit to future choices. We prove existence of electoral equilibria, and we show that office holders mix between...

We develop a dynamic political economy model in which investment in the state capacity to levy taxes and deter crime is a policy variable, and we study the evolution of state capacity when policy is chosen by an elite. We show that democratization in the sense of expansion of the elite leads to...

We propose and develop an algebraic approach to revealed preference. Our approach dispenses with non algebraic structure, such as topological assumptions. We provide an algebraic axiom of revealed preference that subsumes previous, classical revealed preference axioms, and show that a dataset is...

We study minimal conditions for competitive behavior with few agents, adapting the strategic market game of Dubey (1982), Simon (1984) and Benassy (1986) to an indivisible good environment. We show that all Nash equilibrium outcomes with active trading are competitive if and only if there are at...