This paper analyses the impact of more frequent portfolio disclosure on mutual funds' performance. Since 2004, SEC requires all U.S. mutual funds to disclose their portfolio holdings on a quarterly basis from semi-annual previously. This change in regulation provides a natural setting to study...

This study further develops and defines the concept of normative transparency of disclosure. As defined, mutual fund normative transparency is that fund proactive, voluntary disclosure as well as legal and regulatory disclosure required for investors to be able to make information efficient fund...

Using a sample of equity closed-end funds, we document significant portfolio holdings disclosure valuation effects and strategic disclosure timing by portfolio managers. An event study analysis reveals statistically significant positive (negative) abnormal returns associated with early (late)...

We study the agency implications of increased disclosure using a regulatory change in the mutual fund industry as an experimental setting. This quasi-natural experiment mandated more frequent portfolio disclosure, which we show imposes managerial skill re-assessment risks from investors on funds...

The Investment Company Act of 1940 states that the interests of shareholders are compromised when mutual funds are operated in the interest of fund advisers. In this regard, one of the Act's major objectives is to ensure that investors receive adequate and accurate information.This study focuses...

Valuation risk of a security—uncertainty about its fair value—is a subject of considerable concern in the mutual fund industry. If funds report different values for identical securities, investors cannot easily compare performance. Yet it is not unusual to see identical illiquid stocks,...