, as is suggested by the literature on deception and procedural satisfaction. Models such as Rabin (1993), Sen (1997), and …-based models such as Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (1997) predict otherwise. We find that deception …

a new experimental design, the Conditional Information Lottery, which offers all the benefits of deception without … deception is used and the data cohere well both internally and with other public goods experiments. In addition, simultaneous … start. The results suggest pronounced elements of overconfidence, egoism and (biased) reciprocity in behaviour, which may …

implements a new experimental design, the Conditional Information Lottery, which offers all the benefits of deception without … high contributions. No deception is used and the data cohere well both internally and with other public goods experiments …) reciprocity in behaviour, which may explain decay in contributions in repeated play designs. The experiment shows there is a …

inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which …

ofoverconfidence, egoism and (biased) reciprocity in behaviour, whichmay explain decay in contributions in repeatedplay designs. The …

research is to extend past work on trust and reciprocity by examining the impact of the social contexts within which social … reciprocity differ in the contexts of inter-individual and inter-group interactions. First, I examine whether dynamics of trust … and reciprocity differ in various inter-group interactions where inter-group decisions are operationalized as 1 …