We develop a model for the analysis of macroeconomic management that are caused by failures in the private banking system. Our analysis is applied to Tanzania, a country that faces significant difficulties from a banking system that holds large quantities of non-performing assets. We have...

The success of joint liability programs depends on nature and composition of borrowing groups. Group formation is a costly process and in our model these costs vary with the social identity of group partners. We show that risk heterogeneity in a borrowing group may arise due to the social...

We examine how trade sanctions can be imposed effectively in a trading network. We focus on three factors that affect trade sanctions: a country’s endowment, distance between trading countries, and connectivity in the network. Our models explain several empirical observations: (i) sanctions...

We consider an incomplete information network game in which agents’ information is restricted only to the identity of their immediate neighbors. Agents form beliefs about the adjacency pattern of others and play a linear-quadratic effort game to maximize interim payoffs. We establish the...

We study a public goods game with heterogeneous agents who care about their own payoff as well as of the player who receives the lowest payoff. The weight on own payoff varies across players, and is private information. We first develop a theoretical model and then test the predictions of our...

A growing strand of literature documents how historical agricultural and ecological factors continue to determine women’s role and well-being in society through cultural transmission even today. Studies have shown that such factors are significantly associated with perceptions regarding...

We study the effects of a randomized role models intervention in which female engineering students gave presentations at high schools about their experiences in the major. Among girls, we find an increased preference for engineering majors for those in the top math ability quartile; with stronger...

We consider a multimarket framework where a set of firms compete on two interrelated oligopolistic markets. Prior to competing in these markets, firms can spy on others in order to increase the quality of their product. We characterize the equilibrium espionage networks and networks that...

We consider a multimarket framework where a set of firms compete on two interrelated oligopolistic markets. Prior to competing in these markets, firms can spy on others in order to increase the quality of their product. We characterize the equilibrium espionage networks and networks that...