In the standard auction model, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition on the value domain under which non …

We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily …

We explore the impact of private information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily …

This paper explores the consequences of information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and …

We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily …

We study when equilibrium prices can aggregate information in an auction market with a large population of traders. Our …

We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily …

We study a stochastic auction in a multi-items and unit-demand setting where bidders have one-dimensional type spaces …. In a usual Pareto-efficient auction such as the VCG auction, items are allocated deterministically to bidders depending … on their bids. However, even if an auctioneer implements a deterministic auction repeatedly, data that the auctioneer and …

shill bidding in strategy-proof auctions more generally. As a remedy, this paper considers an ascending auction with a … random ending time --- a so-called candle auction. Time is discrete and in every round, the bidders bid sequentially and in a … fixed order. The bidder with the highest bid at the end of the decisive round wins the auction and pays her bid. We show …

monopolistic seller, duopolistic sellers do not both offer an unrestricted VCG mechanism, i.e., a combinatorial auction. Rather …