Stefanie Gäbler prepared this study while she was working at the ifo Center for Public Finance and Political Economy. The study was completed in March 2020 and accepted as doctoral thesis by the Department of Economics at the University of Munich. It consists of six distinct empirical essays...

In Deutschland soll ein Lobbyregister eingeführt werden. Fraglich ist, ob das vorgesehene Gesetz ausgewogene Regelungen vorsieht, um für hinreichende Transparenz in der Einflussnahme zu sorgen. Die vorgeschlagenen Maßnahmen reichen nicht aus, um die Einflussnahme vollständig und aktuell...

In major legal orders such as UK, the U.S., Germany, and France, bribers and recipients face equally severe criminal sanctions. In contrast, countries like China, Russia, and Japan treat the briber more mildly. Given these differences between symmetric and asymmetric punishment regimes for...

Diverse Skandale haben die öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten in Misskredit gebracht. Dies hat erneut die Diskussion entfacht, ob der Rundfunk überhaupt in öffentlicher Hand produziert werden sollte. Die Autoren untersuchen dies aus ökonomischer Sicht, diskutieren die seit Anfang 2013...

We analyse policy makers' incentives to fight corruption under different institutional qualities. We find that 'public officials', even when non-corrupt, significantly distort anti-corruption institutions by choosing a lower detection probability when this probability applies to their own...

We often use delegation as a commitment device if a government faces problems of timeinconsistency. McCallum (1995, AER P&P) challenged this practice, claiming that delegation merely relocates the commitment problem but does not solve it. In a model where delegation and specific policies are...

We take for granted that the basic choice in public policy is between allocation of resources by government bureaucracy, on the one hand, or allocation by markets, on the other. But that dichotomy is false, and at least under contemporary circumstances it is more accurate to describe the choice...

In this work I combine the individualistic approach of economic theory with the social view of other social sciences to study corruption and the role of institutions and monitoring agencies when corruption takes place in a network structure. I will try to prove that if the social network is...

I analyze subjects' sensitivity to parametric change that does not affect the theoretical prediction. I find that increasing the value of an illegal transaction to a briber and reducing the penalties to both culprits leads to more bribes being paid but does not affect the cooperation of the...

We study the effects of loaded instructions in a bribery experiment. We find a strong gender effect: men and women react differently to real-world framing. The treatment effect becomes significant once we allow for gender specific coefficients. Our paper contributes to the (small) literature on...