This paper looks at potential implications emerging from including shares as a control variable in fixed effect estimations. By shares I refer to the ratio of a sum of units over another, such as the share of immigrants in a city or school. As will be shown in this paper, a logarithmic...

Many economic and political decisions are the outcome of strategic contests for a given prize. The nature of such contests can be determined by a designer who is driven by political considerations with a specific political culture. The main objective of this study is to analyze the effect of...

This paper examines the correlated random coefficient model. It extends the analysis of Swamy (1971, 1974), who pioneered the uncorrelated random coefficient model in economics. We develop the properties of the correlated random coefficient model and derive a new representation of the variance...

This paper proposes an assignment model where sorting occurs on attributes including both skills (Sattinger, 1979) and preferences (Tinbergen, 1956). The key feature of this model is that the wage function admits both jobs' and workers' attributes as arguments. Since this function is generically...

Within a general equilibrium framework of a developing economy with a foreign owned factor of production, this paper questions whether the informal-formal sector relationship is procyclical/ complementary - expansion or contraction in one necessarily implies an expansion or contraction in the...

We characterize how public insurance schemes are constrained by hidden financial transactions. When non-exclusive private insurance entails increasing unit transaction costs, public transfers are only partly offset by hidden private transactions, and can influence consumption allocation. We show...

Guasoni (2006) introduced a simple condition for the absence of arbitrage opportunities. In this note we show that his results remain valid under a weaker notion of arbitrage which arises by excluding liquidation costs from the value process of a portfolio.

We consider a sequential game in which one player produces a public good and the other player can influence this decision by making an unconditional transfer. An efficient allocation requires the Lindahl property: the sum of the two (implicit) individual prices has to be equal to the resource...

We analyse how state university competition to collect resources may affect both research and the quality of teaching. By considering a set-up where two state universities behave strategically, we model their interaction with potential students as a sequential noncooperative game. We show that...